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The very nature of extradition involves the sending of individuals 
to face justice in remote localities.  Unlike civil law states, which 
generally don’t extradite their own nationals, Australia and other 
common law states have readily surrendered their citizens to face 
justice in foreign states.  While that usually involves returning the 
person to the state where the offence occurred, the emergence of 
trans-national criminal activity and the expansive extra-territorial 
jurisdiction exercised by some states can lead to persons being 
extradited to countries with which they have had no direct 
connection and in which they have never set foot. This paper 
considers some of the developments in international extradition 
law; with particular emphasis on the extent to which Australia will 
consider matters such as the quality of the foreign justice system 
and the likely treatment of the person should they be surrendered. 
 
 
1 The changing nature of criminal activity and laws 
 
In earlier times extradition largely involved the pursuit and return of citizens who 
were fugitives from justice in their own land.  That is reflected in the earliest recorded 
extradition treaties, including in the following extract from the Treaty between the 
Kings of Andarig and Leilan and an unidentified third party in about 1750 BC:1 
 
“(he who) from a foreign land escapes, and is seen in my country, I shall not 
hide him, I shall not sell him for silver; on that very same day I shall send him 
home safely.” 
 
More recently, with the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries and the 
development of new commercial structures and greater flow of people between states, 
new types of criminal activity emerged, including activity that crossed national 
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boundaries. Under this new order, increasingly extradition applications involved 
requests for the surrender of non-nationals of the requesting state.   
 
That trend has continued apace. The computer age, multi-national corporations, and 
the ever increasing trade and movement of people between states have given rise to 
yet new forms of criminal activity and the capacity for people to commit offences 
which have impact well beyond their national borders.  This is exemplified by the 
“Love Bug” virus of 2000.  In May 2000 this virus appeared on the internet and 
spread around the world in 2 hours. It is estimated to have affected 45 million users in 
over 20 countries and to have caused between US$2 and 10 billion in damage.   
 
The laws of many states have changed, and continue to change, in response to these 
developments, and include the introduction of economic crimes that have extra-
territorial effect.  
 
Traditionally, the jurisdiction of states over crime is categorized under five principles: 
the territorial principle; the nationality principle; the passive personality principle; the 
protective principle; and the universality principle. To some extent, the capacity to 
deal with trans-national crime can be catered for under a broad approach to the 
territorial principle, so that jurisdiction arises where any one element of the offence 
occurs in the state in question.  On that basis, for example, a state has jurisdiction 
where acts are carried out in that state pursuant to a conspiracy, even though the 
person charged as being a party to that conspiracy has never entered the state.2 
 
However, multi-national corporate structures and the growth of international trade has 
made it difficult for states to control anti-competitive commercial practices in 
circumstances where the proscribed conduct, though having an affect on the 
prosecuting state, is carried out by foreign corporations on foreign soil.  In those 
circumstances, the territorial principle has no application, as no conduct constituting 
an element of the alleged offence has occurred in the affected state.   
 
Accordingly, some states have taken an expansive approach to the protective principle 
to justify an extra-territorial application of certain laws, including anti-trust laws.3  
The protective principle is based on the premise that a state has jurisdiction where 
conduct, though occurring outside its borders, affects the vital interests of that state. It 
is a very subjective jurisdictional basis, as it is an open question as to what are a 
state’s vital interests.4  Given the extension of the protective principle to anti-trust 
                                                 
2
    For example, in Griffiths v United States of America (2005) 143 FCR 182, it was held that 
Australia could extradite Griffiths to the United States to face charges of conspiracy to engage in 
internet software piracy in the United States in violation of United States law, even though at all 
relevant times he was physically located in Australia.  While the case was considered from the 
perspective of the principle of double criminality, clearly it was sufficient that part of the 
conspiracy was carried out in the United States to establish jurisdiction under the territoriality 
principle. 
3
    It has also been suggested that increasingly extra-territorial legislation, which includes the 
imposition of criminal penalties, is being used to promote foreign policy objectives: see, for 
example, Senz and Charlsworth, ‘Building Blocks: Australia’s Response to Foreign Extraterritorial 
Legislation’, [2001] Melb JIL 3. The authors give as an example the United States Helms-Burton 
Act of 1996, which it is said aims to isolate Cuba and to enforce the US economic embargo on that 
country. 
4
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laws, it is evident that at least some states have taken the view that it applies where a 
state’s economic interests are affected by extra-territorial conduct. 
 
In the United States, for example, the protective principle has been applied in order to 
prosecute extra-territorial breaches of the Sherman Act, which prohibits anti-
competitive contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, and the 
Clayton Act, which is concerned with preventing activity, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, which may restrain trade.5 They are designed to facilitate the effective 
working of the marketplace and to protect it from practices such as price fixing, 
market division, bid rigging, boycotts, and tying arrangements. 
 
The Restatement [Third] of (US) Foreign Relations Law recognizes that laws can be 
passed in relation to conduct occurring outside the state where that conduct has or is 
intended to have substantial effect within the state.  However, s 403 provides: “a state 
may not exercise jurisdiction … with respect to a person or activity having 
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
unreasonable”.  In relation to the question of what is ‘reasonable’, there seems to have 
been wide latitude allowed in prosecuting cases involving drug trafficking6 and 
alleged Sherman Act violations. 
 
Under the Sherman Act, an ‘effects’ test is used, so that it is not a question of whether 
the conduct takes place on United States soil, but whether the conduct has an effect in 
the United States. It is “the situs of the effect, not the conduct, that is crucial”: United 
Phosphorous Ltd v Angus Chemical Co:7 In relation to import commerce, the 
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct “that was meant to produce and did in fact 
produce some substantial effect in the US”: Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California.8  
In Hartford Fire Insurance, the alleged anticompetitive conduct was undertaken by 
foreign re-insurers in the United Kingdom. The United States antitrust laws were 
applied where a group of British reinsurance companies were accused of conspiring to 
limit the availability of certain types of insurance coverage in the United States.9   
 
Similarly, in US v Nippon Paper Industries Co Ltd,10 the court refused to dismiss a 
federal criminal indictment against a Japanese manufacturer of facsimile paper.  It 
was alleged that Nippon Paper Industries (NPI) had participated in a conspiracy with 
other fax paper manufacturers to increase the price of thermal fax paper to be sold in 
North America, in violation of the Sherman Act.  The indictment claimed that the 
manufacturers sold the fax paper, in Japan, to trading houses, which in turn sold the 
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    As to the extension of the Sherman Act to conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign 
states, see s 7 of the Act. 
6
     See, for example, United States v Alomia-Riascos 825 F 2d 769 (4th Cir 1987). 
7
     US Dist (ND Ill Oct 13, 1994).   
8
    113 S Ct 2891 at 2909 (1993). In relation to other foreign commerce, it appears that there is a more 
limited jurisdiction imposed by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act [codified at 15 USC 
s 6a] – the FTAIA limits subject matter jurisdiction over US export commerce to conduct having a 
“direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable” effect on domestic US commerce, on US import 
trade, or on export commerce of a person engaged in such commerce in the US. 
9
    It was argued that comity consideration should exclude the application of United States laws given 
the potential conflict with United Kingdom law and policy. However, the court held that comity 
requires abstention in this context only where there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and 
foreign law.  There was no such conflict here, as the foreign re-insurers did not face direct 
conflicting requirements under United States and United Kingdom laws. 
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   109 F 3d 1 (1st Cir 1997).  
 4 
paper to foreign customers.  It was said that they not only raised the prices to the 
trading houses for fax paper to be exported to North America, but also sold discrete 
quantities of fax paper to the trading houses on condition that such quantities be sold 
to North American customers at specified prices.  While separate indictments against 
the trading houses alleged specific conduct within the United States in furtherance of 
the scheme, it was argued that the indictment in relation to the manufacturers 
disclosed no overt acts undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy within the United 
States. It was held that even if this were so, it was not necessary to prove that any 
proscribed conduct took place within the United States in order to establish a 
cognizable Sherman Act offence. Accordingly, even if the alleged proscribed conduct 
occurred entirely in Japan, it was held that liability under United Stats law could arise 
so long as the conduct was intended to have, and did in fact have, substantial 
anticompetitive effects in the United States. It was said that to hold otherwise would 
mean that price fixers could locate their conspiracy offshore when seeking to 
influence competition in United States’ markets.11 
 
Such laws expose citizens of Australia and other countries to liability to prosecution 
in foreign states and, pursuant to bilateral extradition treaties, extradition to those 
states.  On that basis, today citizens might be extradited not only to face prosecution 
in states to which they have travelled and allegedly committed offences, but also to 
countries in which they have never set foot. 
 
 
2 Extradition of a state’s own nationals 
 
Civil law states tend not to extradite their own citizens and in some cases there is a 
constitutional prohibition on doing so.12   This stems from Greek and Roman practice, 
though Roman law did allow the surrender of citizens who did violence to the 
ambassadors of other countries while in Roman territory.13  On the other hand, civil 
law states tend to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals wherever in the world the 
conduct occurs, so that prosecution can take place in the event of a refusal to 
extradite.14 This is based on the notion that citizenship carries benefits as well as 
obligations and a state has in interest in the conduct of its citizens no matter where 
that conduct occurs; the conduct of citizens abroad affects the reputation of the state. 
 
The civil law approach has been justified on a number of grounds, including that a 
person should not be withdrawn from his or her natural judges, that rehabilitation is 
best accomplished in the person’s habitual surroundings, that there are inherent 
disadvantages in being subjected to trial under a foreign system and language and 
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   For the approach to the extra-territorial operation of antitrust laws in Europe, see, for example, 
Chemical Industries v Commission [1972] ECR 619; Ahlstrom v Commission (1988) ECR 5193; 
Gencor v Commission (1999) ECR II-753. Some states have resisted foreign antitrust laws by 
enacting blocking legislation; such as measures to prevent the blocking states’ nationals providing 
evidence, information or documents to any relevant antitrust hearing, and baring the enforcement 
of any judgment within the territory of the blocking state: see, for example, the United Kingdom’s 
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, Australia’s Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) 
Act 1984, and Canada’s Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 1985. 
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    SD Bedi, Extradition in International Law and Practice, 1968, p 94; E Palmer, The Austrian Law 
of Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 1983, p 61. 
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     E Clarke, A Treatise Upon the Law of Extradition, (1888), pp 17-18. 
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    See Aughterson, note 1 above, pp 127-129. 
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remote from friends and resources, that there is a potential for bias against foreigners, 
and that a state owes a special duty to its citizens.15 
 
Common law states have not had the same concerns. Jurisdiction is based primarily 
on territoriality and as a criminal act is viewed as an offence against the peace of the 
community in which it occurred, it is considered that an alleged offender should be 
tried by his or her neighbours at or near that locality.16 Accordingly, extradition laws 
in common law countries, including those in Australia,17 generally make no 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens.  Indeed, one American commentator 
has suggested that the United States “manifests almost an enthusiasm for extraditing 
its own citizens to places abroad”.18   
 
While bilateral extradition treaties entered into between states invariably include 
discretion to refuse extradition of a state’s own nationals, such provisions cater for the 
sensitivities and legal limitations of civil law states.19 
 
 
3 Protections provided to nationals 
 
It follows that Australians can be extradited to foreign countries with which they have 
had little or no contact and where they will face trial in circumstances where the 
language, laws, processes and customs are foreign to them. 
 
Generally, the object and concern of modern extradition treaties and other extradition 
arrangements has been not only to facilitate the return of persons to foreign states in 
accordance with the terms of the treaty, but also to protect the rights of the individual.  
As stated in Bou-Simon v Attorney-General (Cth):20 
 
Extradition procedures are designed not only to ensure that criminals are 
returned from one country to another but also to protect the rights of those who 
are accused of crimes by the requesting country. 
                                                 
15
    Ibid pp 128-129. 
16
    See I A Shearer, Extradition in International Law,  (1971) pp 121-122; Herman F Woltring, 
‘Extradition Law’, (1987) Law Inst J 919 at 922; H C Biron and K E Chalmers, The Law and 
Practice of Extradition, (1903) p 7.  Biron and Chalmers note, at p 7, that the territorial base of 
jurisdiction had its origin “in the most primitive tribal stage of human history.  The offender had 
but few means of escape, and if he evaded arrest it was not as a rule because he had fled from the 
borders of his own commune.  In that rare event the tendency was to regard him as beyond the 
reach of punishment”.  There are limitations to the approach adopted by civil law states, including 
the practical difficulties in conducting a trial remote from the primary sources of evidence. 
17
    Since mid 1995, approximately 20% of persons extradited from Australia have been Australian 
citizens: see Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Annual Reports for the years 
1995-1996 to 2003-2004, www.ag.gov.au, ‘Publications’ – ‘Annual Reports’ folders.  While, s 45 
of the Extradition Act does allow for the prosecution of Australian citizens in relation to conduct 
occurring in foreign states, that will have no utility unless the relevant Australian criminal law has 
extrad-territorial effect. 
18
    John G Kester, ‘Some Myths of United States Extradition Law’, (1988) 76 Geo LJ 1441 at 1474-
1475.  
19
    For examples of treaty provisions, see Aughterson, n 1 above, pp 130-131. 
20
   [1998] FCA 1097. 
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Similarly, in Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice, Drummond J stated that the 
law of extradition:21 
 
is not concerned only with matters affecting Australia’s national interests but 
also with the protection of the fugitive from injustice in the extradition country. 
 
However, in Australia the trend has been towards facilitating extradition and reducing 
the protections afforded to those who are sought by foreign states. Certain of the 
protections that are now provided, and those that are not, are outlined below. 
 
Underlying that lack of protection is the pretence in this country that the legal systems 
and processes of all countries with which Australia has extradition arrangements are 
fair and reasonable.22  That assumption is reflected in the judgment of French J in 
Cabal v United Mexican States (No 3).23 In response to a submission that the 
requesting State had an ulterior purpose in seeking the extradition of Cabal, his 
Honour stated: 
 
It is no light matter for the magistrate or this Court to conclude that there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the requesting country is acting in bad 
faith, especially given the necessary assumption that the offences have been 
committed.  There is also the existence of the Treaty itself to which regard must 
be had.  Where there is a treaty in force, its existence no doubt reflects a degree 
of mutual trust and confidence between the contracting parties as to their bona 
fides and the fairness of treatment that would be meted out by one or the other to 
a fugitive who has been surrendered. 
 
Even if that assumption were correct, as noted by Shearer the conditions in a treaty 
state can suddenly deteriorate through a coup or emergency situation, or there may be 
“a steady erosion of the rule of law such as in Zimbabwe”.24  Others have questioned 
the underlying justification of the premise.  In Cabal v United Mexican States,25 the 
Full Court of the Federal Court stated: 
 
Australia has extradition treaties with many countries. A number of these 
countries have legal systems very different from our own. Some of them would 
not be regarded as affording those charged with serious criminal offences 
anything approximating what we would consider a fair trial. They appear to 
have very little regard for the importance of an independent judiciary and the 
rule of law. Some are reputed to be governed by regimes which are thoroughly 
corrupt. 
 
It remains that the Australian extradition legislation draws little distinction as between 
states.  The only distinction that does exist is in relation to whether or not, by treaty or 
regulation, there is need to establish a prima facie case as a precondition to surrender. 
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   (1999) 164 ALR 357 at 368. 
22
    See the observations in the Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties of the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth of Australia, Extradition – a review of Australia’s law and policy, Report 
40, August 2001, 30. 
23
    (2000) 186 ALR 188 at 268. 
24
    Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, note 22 above, 30. 
25
    Ibid 30-32 
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As noted below, 26 incongruously that protection has been preserved only in relation 
to extradition to most member states of the British Commonwealth and to certain 
other countries where there would be relatively less concern as to legal and procedural 
safeguards. 
 
Further, the trend has been to reduce the involvement of the courts in the process and 
to expand the executive discretion. 
 
3.1 Judicial involvement in the process 
 
There are four steps in the Australian extradition process, each involving a discrete 
exercise of power.27  First, pursuant to section 12 of the Act, a request is made to an 
Australian magistrate for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the person sought. 
Second, following the formal request for extradition, the Attorney-General must 
determine whether the application should proceed.  Third, in the event that the matter 
is to proceed, it is referred to a magistrate for determination as to whether the person 
is ‘eligible for surrender’.  The magistrate ‘is not at large’,28 jurisdiction being 
confined to a consideration of whether the necessary documentation has been 
produced,29 whether double criminality can be established, whether there are any 
‘extradition objections’ under section 7 of the Act and, where imported by treaty or 
regulation, whether a prima facie case can be established.30 At the fourth step, it is the 
Attorney-General, and not the courts, who determines all other matters, including any 
additional human rights protections under the relevant treaty.31  It is also the Attorney-
General who is to be satisfied that the person will not be subjected to torture, that 
appropriate assurances have been given in relation to the non-imposition of the death 
penalty, and that a speciality assurance has been given.32 The Attorney-General also 
has a general discretion to deny surrender.33 
 
Consequently, other than in relation to the limited objections under s 7 of the Act,34 
there is a principle of ‘non-inquiry’ by the courts into the conditions or circumstances 
awaiting the person in the requesting state, including whether the rule of law or 
human rights norms are observed.  For example, in Stanton v DPP,35 while the court 
was concerned as to the likelihood of a fair trial if the persons sought were extradited 
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    See, below, n 41 and 42 and related text. 
27
  See generally, Harris v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (1994) 52 FCR 386, 389, where 
the Full Federal Court characterised the stages of the extradition process as (1) commencement; (2) 
remand; (3) determination by a magistrate of eligibility for surrender; and (4) executive 
determination that the person is to be surrendered. See also DPP v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528, 
533-38 for ‘a brief conspectus of the Act’. 
28
   Kainhofer v DPP (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 184, 189. 
29
   As to which see s 19(3) of the Act. The documents include a statement of the conduct constituting 
the extradition offence, which forms the basis for consideration of the principle of double 
criminality. 
30
    Pursuant to section 21 of the Act, there is a right of review and, ultimately, appeal from the 
determination of the magistrate. 
31
    See s 22(3)(e) of the Act. For example, in Federal Republic of Germany v Parker (1998) 101 A 
Crim R 234, 252 it was held that whether there had been production of the additional information 
required by the treaty in relation to the identity of the person sought was a matter for the Attorney-
General. 
32
    See s 22(3) of the Act. 
33
    See s 22(3)(f) of the Act. 
34
    As to which, see below at Part 3.4. 
35
    Federal Court, Spender J, 12 January 1993. 
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to the Philippines, it was acknowledged that the Act gave no scope for judicial review 
on that ground. In the event, the Attorney-General subsequently refused surrender. 
 
While there is potential for review of the Attorney-General’s determination under 
section 39B of the Judiciary Act,36 that review is not on the merits of the decision, but 
is concerned with whether the matter was within power and whether the appropriate 
process was followed.37 Certainly, where any determination rests on discretion, it is 
difficult to show that its exercise has miscarried.38 As noted by the Full Court of the 
Federal Court in Papazoglou v Republic of the Philippines:39 
 
While determinations made by the Attorney-General under ss 16 and 22 of the 
Extradition Act can be reviewed pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act, that 
review is limited in scope. Even if the Attorney-General ultimately decides that 
a person should not be surrendered, that person may be required to spend a 
considerable time in custody without any court having power to determine 
whether there is evidence to support the charges and, as this case shows, without 
a court having power to consider whether the proceedings against the person 
constitute an abuse of the court’s process. 
 
Even those matters that are considered by the magistrate – whether the relevant 
documentation has been produced, whether double criminality can be established, 
whether there are any extradition objections, and, where imported by treaty, whether a 
prima facie case can be established – are of limited scope. 
 
3.2 Establishment of a prima facie case 
 
Generally, the requirement under earlier extradition legislation to establish a prima 
facie case has been removed. While such a requirement can be imported by 
regulations applying to a particular country,40 generally it has not been incorporated 
into modern extradition treaties.41 Ironically, by virtue of the Extradition 
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   DPP v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528, 541; Federal Republic of Germany v Parker (1998) 101 
Crim L R 234, 252; Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (1999) 164 ALR 357, 359; Forsyth 
v United Kingdom Federal Court, 19 August 2003, Carr J, [38]. 
37
   Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (1999) 164 ALR 357, 359-60 per Drummond J. 
38
    It seems that in the context of extradition proceedings, the only successful application for review 
was in De Bruyn v Republic of South Africa (2005) 143 FCR 162: see Joint Standing Committee 
on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 57.  For a relatively recent unsuccessful application under s 
39B, see McCrea v Minister for Customs & Justice (2005) 145 FCR 269.  Compare the approach 
now in the United Kingdom.  In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 
AC 532, 545-546, Lord Bingham, with whom the other Law Lords agreed, stated:   
In Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493, the European Court held that the orthodox 
domestic approach of the English courts had not given the applicants an effective remedy for the breach 
of their rights under article 8 of the Convention because the threshold of review had been set too high. 
Now, following the incorporation of the Convention by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the bringing of 
that Act fully into force, domestic courts must themselves form a judgment whether a Convention right 
has been breached (conducting such inquiry as is necessary to form that judgment) and, so far as 
permissible under the Act, grant an effective remedy.  
39
    (1997) 74 FCR 108, 140. In that case, where it was argued that great injustice would result if 
extradition were ordered, the court noted: ‘A decision by the Attorney-General to surrender the 
person cannot be challenged on the merits’: at 128. 
40
    See s 11(4), (5) and (6) of the Act. 
41
    Though see agreements or treaties with Hong Kong art 5; Israel art XI(iii); Republic of Korea art 
3; Norway art 8; and United States of America art XI. 
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(Commonwealth) Countries Regulations, it is a precondition to extradition to most 
member states of the British Commonwealth.42 
 
The abolition of the requirement to establish a prima facie case in the mid 1980s was 
said to be justified in the interests of efficiency and speed of handling requests, and so 
as to give reciprocity of treatment to those foreign countries that did not apply – or 
even understand – the prima facie evidence requirement.43  The decision has been 
criticised as being ‘over-hasty and unwise’ and as a ‘mistake’.44 
 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the requirement to establish a prima 
facie case ‘reflects an unjustified attitude of superiority on the part of common law 
systems and is considered “alien and unacceptable” by civil law countries’ and that in 
the civil law system there is no equivalent to a committal hearing and that these 
countries find it ‘impossible or prohibitively expensive’ to meet the requirement.45 
While some commentators have disputed the potential difficulties facing civil law 
states,46 Shearer has noted:47 
 
I suggest that the sense of justice of most people would be offended by any law, 
statutory in basis or not, that can have people taken away from their own home 
to a distant country to face trial on matters alleged against them and in relation 
to which the courts in their own country have no power to review for probable 
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    However, the requirement has been removed in relation to South Africa, the United Kingdom and 
Canada: see Extradition (South Africa) Regulations 2001; Extradition (Canada) Regulations 2004; 
Extradition (United Kingdom) Regulations 2004; Extradition (commonwealth Countries) 
Regulations 1998. In referring to this different approach in relation to Commonwealth countries, 
the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties of the Australian Parliament has noted: ‘we found it 
incongruous that quite different standards of proof apply to extradition requests from 
Commonwealth countries and civil law countries, and that far more supporting evidence is 
required from countries whose systems of justice closely resemble Australia’s. Conversely, less is 
required of countries where the implications of agreeing to surrender a person are potentially much 
more onerous, in that the legal system is quite different, proceedings may well be conducted in 
another language, and there may be reservations about due legal process and the protection of 
human rights’: see Joint Standing Committee on Treaties of the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, An Extradition Arrangement with Latvia and an Agreement with the United States of 
America on Space Vehicle Tracking and Communication, Report 36, October 2000, 13; Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 21. 
43
  Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Report 36, n 42 above, Submission 8, 50-51. See also Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 2-3. As to the object of facilitating the 
conclusion of extradition treaties with civil law states, see Hansard, House of Representatives, 9 
December 1987, 3069, 3078-79, 3108. 
44
    Shearer has stated:  
In my view, the abandonment of the prima facie requirement in Australia’s extradition treaty and 
legislative policy was over-hasty and unwise. It is unjust that a person (especially an Australian citizen) 
may be extradited to a foreign country on the mere demand (albeit subject to certain safeguards) of that 
country’s authorities and without any opportunity for an Australian court to examine the evidence. 
See Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Report 36, n 42 above, Submission 8, 50-51; Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 3. Dr David Chaikin, a Senior Assistant 
Secretary of the International Branch in the Attorney-General’s Department when the key policy 
changes were made in the mid-1980s has also expressed the view that, in making the changes, 
Australia ‘went too far’ and that ‘it was a mistake’: Report 40, 29. 
45
    See submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties by the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department: Report 40, n 22 above, 26. 
46
    See Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 44-45. 
47
    Ibid 29. Shearer has also expressed the view that the perceived difficulty said to be facing civil law 
states ‘has been greatly exaggerated’: ibid 44-45.  
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cause or reasonable suspicion. The civil law countries do not return our favour: 
they refuse altogether to surrender their own citizens, prima facie case or no 
prima facie case. 
 
3.3  Documentation and Double Criminality 
 
The principle of double criminality holds that a person will not be extradited where 
the conduct for which extradition is sought is not considered criminal in the requested 
state. Its rationale is that a state should not be required to surrender a person to a 
foreign state, and allow its criminal processes to be used, for conduct which it does 
not itself consider criminal.48   
 
The primary documentation produced to the magistrate is the statement of ‘the 
conduct constituting the offence’ pursuant to s 19(3)(c)(ii) of the Act. It is this 
document that forms the basis for the determination of whether double criminality can 
be established.  Section 10(2) provides: 
 
A reference in this Act to conduct constituting an offence is a reference to the 
acts or omissions, or both, by virtue of which the offence has, or is alleged to 
have, been committed. 
 
By section 19(2)(c), the magistrate must be satisfied that at the time of the extradition 
request the ‘conduct constituting the offence’, or equivalent conduct, would have 
constituted an offence in the state or territory in Australia where the extradition 
hearing is held. That is determined solely by reference to the section 19(3)(c)(ii) 
statement.49 
 
The Federal Court has interpreted the term ‘conduct constituting the offence’ broadly. 
Rather than focusing on the words ‘by virtue of which’ the offence has been 
committed in section 10(2), in Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany the Court 
placed emphasis on the words ‘is alleged to have been committed’, concluding that 
the statement of conduct was not invalid because it alleged facts, “which goes beyond 
the facts necessarily constituting the offence” in the requesting state and that it did not 
follow that “the magistrate may have regard only to those facts which are absolutely 
necessary ingredients of the foreign offence”.50  It was added that the “magistrate is 
no expert in foreign law. He is not required to determine what the facts are that are the 
necessary facts to constitute the foreign crime”.51 
 
However, it is suggested that the reference in section 10(2) to the acts by which the 
offence ‘has, or is alleged to have, been committed’, simply reflects the fact that 
extradition may be sought of persons either charged with or convicted of an offence. 
The effect of the approach adopted by the Federal Court seems to be that the ‘conduct 
                                                 
48
     See Aughterson, note 1 above, pp 59-60. 
49
   Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 23 FCR 282, 300. 
50
   Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 23 FCR 282, 300. See, also, Cabal v United 
Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311, 341. Cf De Bruyn v Republic of South Africa (1999) 96 FCR 
290, 292-93, 296-97. 
51
   Ibid. It seems to have been assumed in Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 19 FCR 64, 
90 that under earlier legislation the magistrate could inquire as to the nature of the offence in the 
requesting state. 
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constituting the offence’ is whatever the requesting state specifies in the section 
19(3)(c)(ii) statement, regardless of whether it bears any relationship to the conduct 
that will be prosecuted following surrender.52 
 
In Government of Canada v Aronson,53 where a similar provision was considered,54 
the House of Lords held that a person could be extradited only if the conduct relevant 
to the ingredients of the foreign offence constituted a corresponding offence under the 
United Kingdom law. Lord Bridge gave examples of the ‘startling results’ were the 
law to be otherwise.55 For example, double criminality would not depend on whether 
the acts charged were criminal in both states, but on the manner in which the 
statement of conduct were drafted. As noted by Lord Lowry:56 
 
The “act or omission constituting the offence” cannot in my opinion mean “the 
conduct, as proved by the evidence, on which the charge is grounded,” because 
the evidence of such conduct could prove something more than what has been 
charged. In such a case the conduct proved would not be the act or omission 
constituting the offence of which the fugitive is accused … 
 
Under the approach adopted by the Federal Court, where a person is charged with an 
offence that is not a crime in Australia, but, incidentally, the statement of conduct 
makes reference to acts or omissions that would constitute a crime in this country it 
seems that double criminality will be established. That will be so even though that 
additional conduct will have no relevance to the actual offence charged following 
extradition. That is the very outcome that the principle of double criminality was 
intended to avoid.   
 
3.4 Extradition objections 
 
Section 7 of the Act provides for objections to extradition where the offence is a 
political offence; where there is actual or potential discrimination on account of race, 
religion, nationality or political opinions; where the offence is a military offence; and 
where there would be exposure to double jeopardy.   
 
With the rise of terrorism, the political offence objection has fallen into disfavour and, 
increasingly, has been interpreted narrowly.57 In the United Kingdom it has been 
abolished.58 
                                                 
52
    More recently, the term ‘acts or omissions by virtue of which an offence is alleged to have been 
committed’ was considered by the High Court of Australia in Truong v The Queen (2004) 205 
ALR 72, in the context of the operation of the speciality principle under s 42 of the Act. In relation 
to that decision, see Aughterson, ‘The Extradition Process: An Unreviewable Executive 
Discretion’, [2005] AYBIL 13, n 51. 
53
    [1990] 1 AC 579. 
54
   Under s 3(1)(c) of the Fugitive Offenders Act, a person could be extradited only if ‘the act or 
omission constituting the offence’ would constitute an offence against the law of the United 
Kingdom. Compare the consideration of Aronson in Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany 
(1989) 23 FCR 282, 296-97. 
55
    [1990] 1 AC 579, 589-90. 
56
   Ibid 609. 
57
   See Aughterson, note 1 above, pp 89-111. 
58
    In relation to other European Union States, that is consistent with art 9 of the 14 October 2002 
protocol to the 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member 
States of the European Union, which provides that no offence may be regarded as a political 
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Also, given the approach taken by the Australian courts, the discrimination objection 
to extradition will be difficult to establish. As noted by French J in Cabal v United 
Mexican States (No 3):59 
 
It is no light matter for the magistrate or this Court to conclude that there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the requesting country is acting in bad 
faith, especially given the necessary assumption that the offence has been 
committed. There is also the existence of the Treaty itself to which regard must 
be had. Where there is a treaty in force, its existence no doubt reflects a degree 
of mutual trust and confidence between the contracting parties as to their bona 
fides and the fairness of treatment that would be meted out by one or the other to 
a fugitive who has been surrendered. 
 
The same approach is not taken by all states. As noted by North J in McCrea v 
Minister for Justice and Customs:60 
 
The reluctance of courts in some jurisdictions such as Australia to adjudicate 
upon decisions of sovereign states concerning extradition is not universal.  For 
instance, in some European countries it has been held to be legitimate for 
adjudicative bodies to enquire into the sufficiency and effectiveness of 
assurances: Aylor (1993) 100 ILR 665; see especially the submission of 
Commissionaire du Gouvernement Vigouroux which sets out the practice of a 
number of European nations.  In due course, the law in Australia may take 
account of such jurisprudence and move to an acceptance that the doctrine of 
non-adjudication has less of a place in cases involving questions of fundamental 
human rights, such as cases involving the death penalty. 
 
The cautious approach adopted in Australia is exacerbated by the expansive 
construction given by the Federal Court to 19(5) of the Act, which prohibits the 
magistrate from receiving evidence ‘to contradict an allegation that the person has 
engaged in conduct constituting an extradition offence’. This provision was first 
enacted in 1985, with the abolition of the requirement to establish a prima facie case, 
on the rationale that an extradition hearing is not intended to determine guilt or 
innocence and, accordingly, evidence to that effect should not be led.61 One 
consequence is that a person is unable to lead clearly exculpatory evidence, such as 
alibi evidence.62  
 
However, in Cabal v United Mexican States (No 3),63 French J held that s 19(5) also 
operated to exclude such evidence where the person objected to extradition on the 
                                                                                                                                            
offence as between member states. There is provision for member states to derogate from this 
principle, but not in relation to defined terrorist offences. However, under the UK Act the political 
offence exception has been discarded generally. 
59
   (2000) 186 ALR 188, 268. See, also, Dutton v O’Shane Supreme Court NSW, James J, 20 
November 2002, [321]. 
60
   [2004] FCA 273 para 56. 
61
   Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Amendment Bill 1985, Second Reading Speech, Attorney-
General Mr L Bowen, House of Representatives 1985 Debates, vol HR 140, 596. See, also, Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 58. 
62
   See Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228, 250. 
63
   (2000) 186 ALR 188, 266. 
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basis of actual or potential discrimination on account of his or her race, religion, 
nationality or political opinions, stating that s 19(5):64 
 
excludes debate before the magistrate that the charges have been falsely 
fabricated because of the person’s political opinion. That wider consideration, if 
available at all, is reserved for the Attorney-General in deciding whether to issue 
a notice under s 16 and, ultimately, whether to surrender the requested person 
under s 22. 
 
It is unlikely that section 19(5) was ever intended to have that effect. It is noted that in 
introducing section 19(5), and having abolished the general requirement to establish a 
prima facie case, the objective was to avoid a mini trial in this country on the merits 
of the case. Under the new arrangements, whether or not a case existed against the 
person sought was no longer the concern of the Australian magistrate at an extradition 
hearing. However, extradition objections remain a matter for the magistrate in this 
country and there will be circumstances where apparent innocence of the offence 
could be suggestive of an ulterior purpose on the part of the requesting state.  
 
In a submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Julian Burnside QC 
made the compelling point that it is difficult to demonstrate discrimination without 
being able to lead evidence that the charges were false:65 
 
… where a requested person seriously alleges [such] an extradition objection … 
it is likely that the person did not “engage in the conduct” … That is to say, it is 
likely that the person has been falsely accused. There is an argument that this 
prevents evidence being led to show, for example, that the requested person has 
been “framed” for political reasons. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
Australia offers few protections to those of its citizens who are the subject of 
extradition applications and who are sought for prosecution in foreign states. Perhaps 
arising from undue concern as to the prospect of offending foreign states, the 
Australian courts have read down those protections that do exist. Certainly, other 
states, including European states, do not seem to share the same concerns; whether 
responding to extradition applications or seeking the return of alleged offenders.  
 
In relation to the latter, the United States of America, for example, has not 
infrequently resorted to abduction in order to secure the return of alleged offenders, 
notwithstanding the existence of extradition treaties which, at least impliedly, exclude 
such conduct. That practice has the support of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
which has taken the view that it will not inquire into the circumstances in which an 
accused has been brought before the United States courts, even where there has been a 
breach of the principles of international law,66 and that the constitutional guarantee of 
                                                 
64
   Ibid. 
65
   Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 59. 
66
   Though looked at from the quite different perspective of responding to an extradition request, 
compare the view expressed by the High Court of Australia in United Mexican States v Cabal 
(2001) 209 CLR 165, 190:  
 14 
due process is satisfied where the accused is given a fair trial in the United States in 
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards.67 
 
In contrast to the approach adopted in Australia, the new extradition legislation in the 
United Kingdom expands both the role of the judiciary and human rights 
protections.68 The Extradition Act (UK) 2003 creates two categories of countries, 
dealt with separately under Parts 1 and 2 of the Act.  By regulation, countries are 
categorised as falling within either Part 1 or Part 2 and they can be moved between 
those categories. Different processes apply to each Part, with more rigorous processes 
applying to Part 2 countries.69 While it seems that Part 1 mainly caters for member 
states of the European Community, by s 1(3) of the Act a country cannot be 
designated for the purposes of Part 1 where the death penalty may be imposed under 
the general criminal law of that country.  Also, even within Parts 1 and 2, differing 
regimes can apply.70 
 
Importantly, under the United Kingdom legislation, the role of the executive has been 
greatly diminished. The Secretary of State considers only whether appropriate 
assurances have been given in relation to speciality and non-imposition of the death 
penalty.71 Even then, the courts must themselves form a judgment whether a 
Convention right has been breached.72 
 
In the course of the 2001 review of Australia’s extradition law and policy, and in the 
context of the expanded role given to the executive under Australian extradition law, 
it was suggested that:73 
 
The Minister is a political animal and is entitled to take into account all sorts of 
political considerations as well as legal considerations. It is very difficult to 
know exactly how he would treat any particular case.  I think Australian 
                                                                                                                                            
Australia … has a very substantial interest in surrendering the person in accordance with its treaty 
obligations. If Australia fails, when requested, to return a person against whom there is probable cause 
for concluding that he or she has committed an extraditable offence, it breaches its obligations under 
international law. If Australia fails to comply with a treaty, the rules of international law entitle the other 
party to the treaty to repudiate or suspend the performance of its own obligations under the treaty.  
See, also, Truong v The Queen (2004) 205 ALR 72, 102, 108 per Kirby J. 
67
  Ker v Illinois 119 US 436 (1886); United States v Alvarez-Machain 112 S Ct 2188, 119 L Ed 2d 
441at 450 (1992). 
68
   See the United Kingdom Extradition Act 2003 and, in relation to certain provisions of that Act, see 
Aughterson, ‘The Extradition Process: an Unreviewable Executive Discretion?’, 24 AYBIL 13 at 
28-32.  See, also, above n 38. 
69
   Principally, in relation to Part 1 states a backing of warrant procedure is used; there is no 
application to the executive and the process is entirely in the hands of the courts, including a 
determination as to whether the safeguards under the European Convention on Human Rights have 
been preserved. 
70
   For example, the requirement to establish a prima facie case has been preserved in relation to all 
states other than member states of the European Community [Part 1 states] and certain other 
specified states [presently Part 2 states]; namely Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the United States of America: Extradition Act s 84. The Secretary of State can 
designate states as not having to meet this requirement: se 84(7). 
71
   Extradition Act UK ss 94 and 95.  
72
    See Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 and, above, n 38. 
73
   Report 40 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, n 22 above, 56. 
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nationals are entitled to feel safe in their country and not to have to depend upon 
a minister who, of course, in turn relied upon departmental advice.74 
 
As noted by Gyles J in De Bruyn v Republic of South Africa:75 
 
The [Extradition] Act affects the liberty of the subject in a drastic fashion – the 
consequences are far more serious than being charged with a crime in Australia. 
Principles which are applicable in this case (where it might be thought that the 
appellant has few merits) are equally applicable to the case of a long-standing 
Australian citizen with an impeccable record. The questions which arise under 
this statute cannot be dealt with as though they are ordinary commercial or 
administrative law issues. 
                                                 
74
   In relation to departmental advice, it was also suggested: “It may be expected that human rights 
considerations except in the most extraordinary circumstances or in cases required by law (see eg 
death penalty safeguard) will be given a lower priority than international law enforcement interests 
and considerations of good bilateral relations”: ibid 55. 
75
    (1999) 96 FCR 290, 295. See, also, Timar v Republic of Hungry [Full Court of Federal Court, 5 
November 1999, Weinberg J]; Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Report 40, n 22 above, 30. 
